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ABSTRACT
Objectives Most non- communicable diseases are 
preventable and largely driven by the consumption 
of harmful products, such as tobacco, alcohol, 
gambling and ultra- processed food and drink products, 
collectively termed unhealthy commodities. This paper 
explores the links between unhealthy commodity 
industries (UCIs), analyses the extent of alignment 
across their corporate political strategies, and 
proposes a cohesive systems approach to research 
across UCIs.
Methods We held an expert consultation on analysing 
the involvement of UCIs in public health policy, conducted 
an analysis of business links across UCIs, and employed 
taxonomies of corporate political activity to collate, 
compare and illustrate strategies employed by the alcohol, 
ultra- processed food and drink products, tobacco and 
gambling industries.
Results There are clear commonalities across UCIs’ 
strategies in shaping evidence, employing narratives 
and framing techniques, constituency building and 
policy substitution. There is also consistent evidence 
of business links between UCIs, as well as complex 
relationships with government agencies, often 
allowing UCIs to engage in policy- making forums. 
This knowledge indicates that the role of all UCIs in 
public health policy would benefit from a common 
approach to analysis. This enables the development 
of a theoretical framework for understanding how 
UCIs influence the policy process. It highlights the 
need for a deeper and broader understanding of 
conflicts of interests and how to avoid them; and 
a broader conception of what constitutes strong 
evidence generated by a wider range of research 
types.
Conclusion UCIs employ shared strategies to shape public 
health policy, protecting business interests, and thereby 
contributing to the perpetuation of non- communicable 
diseases. A cohesive systems approach to research across 
UCIs is required to deepen shared understanding of this 
complex and interconnected area and also to inform a 
more effective and coherent response.
INTRODUCTION
Over 70% of premature deaths worldwide 
can be attributed to non- communicable 
diseases (NCDs), notably cardiovascular 
disease, cancer, diabetes, dementia, chronic 
respiratory disease, mental health prob-
lems and related conditions such as obesity. 
The majority of premature NCD deaths are 
preventable, being principally caused by the 
consumption of the products of the tobacco, 
alcohol, gambling and ultra- processed food 
Key questions
What is already known?
 ► Most premature deaths from non- communicable 
disease are preventable and largely caused by the 
consumption of the products of unhealthy commodi-
ty industries (UCIs), including tobacco, alcohol, gam-
bling and ultra- processed food and drink products.
 ► Public health governance is characterised by an 
increasingly diversified and complex system of 
decision- making with close relationships between 
state and UCIs.
 ► Evidence indicates that UCIs have deliberately and 
collectively pushed for these forms of governance 
in order to prevent public health policies that might 
threaten profits.
What are the new findings?
 ► There is a convergence of strategic approaches 
across UCIs aimed at shaping public health policy.
 ► There is evidence of business links between UCIs, 
complex inter- relationships between the public and 
private sectors, and across UCIs, and commonalities 
in corporate political strategies.
What do the new findings imply?
 ► A systems approach is required to study UCIs, the 
linkages between them and the way in which they 
collectively influence policy.
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and drink products industries.1–3 These have been collec-
tively referred to as the unhealthy commodity indus-
tries (UCIs), defined as industries or groups of corpo-
rations where a significant share of their product port-
folio comprises unhealthy commodities with high profit 
margins aimed at, and easily accessible to, large numbers 
of consumers.4–6 The gambling industry has received 
less attention than other UCIs as a driver of NCDs, but 
research is expanding rapidly showing that gambling 
is associated not just with alcohol and drug problems, 
but also depression and anxiety.2 3 7–9 The harm from 
gambling is now comparable with that associated with 
alcohol misuse in high- income countries.10 The United 
Nations (UN) and the World Health Organization 
(WHO) have coordinated global commitments to NCD 
prevention over recent decades.11 However, implementa-
tion of effective solutions remains limited. A key barrier 
has been the continued close involvement of UCIs in 
public health policy- making.12 13
Public health governance is broadly defined as the 
set of functions ensuring authority (including scientific 
knowledge), resources, policy development, continuous 
evaluation and improvement, and effective collaboration 
on public health issues.14 This policy arena is character-
ised by an increasingly diversified and complex system of 
decision- making,13 with an often symbiotic relationship 
between states and non- state actors, including corpo-
rations.15 One rationale for the involvement of UCIs in 
public health governance is that those affected by poli-
cies should be allowed to contribute to their formula-
tion.16 This may be problematic for a number of reasons. 
First, it is based on the premise that the power to influ-
ence policy debates is reasonably equally distributed 
across interest groups; this cannot be assumed where 
multinational corporations have vast influence, often 
with annual turnovers exceeding those of many national 
economies.17 Second, evidence indicates that corpo-
rations whose products are damaging to health have 
deliberately and collectively pushed for these forms of 
governance, encouraging policy- making structures that 
embed corporate influence and a reliance on corporate 
evidence specifically in order to prevent public health 
policies that might threaten profits.18–20 Evidence also 
shows how they have used those systems, for example, to 
overwhelm public consultations and to submit misleading 
evidence.21 22 Any potential benefits of UCI involvement 
in public health policy are therefore strongly contested 
due to the differences between their corporate interests 
and public health goals.4
This study sits within the overarching domain of, and 
contributes to research on, the ‘commercial determi-
nants of health’, variously defined as adverse health 
impacts attributable to commercial activities and strate-
gies employed by UCIs to promote products which can 
damage health.23–25
There is growing evidence of convergence of strategic 
approaches between UCIs themselves,26 27 and the need 
for a systems approach to conducting research on UCIs’ 
influence of public health policy. Doing so would concep-
tualise poor health as the result of many factors—such 
as UCIs' shaping of policy—as interconnected elements 
working together to bring about change throughout 
the system.28 A complex systems approach to under-
standing the commercial determinants of health draws 
upon a range of methods to design, implement and eval-
uate interventions at a systems level to improve public 
health;29 it can help explore how UCIs position them-
selves in the complex process of public health decision- 
making and how they legitimise their presence there. 
It can encourage public health researchers to integrate 
mixed methods from a variety of sources and disciplines 
including quantitative and qualitative traditions.30 31 A 
systems approach to research on UCIs offers an analytical 
framework within which to explore not only the condi-
tions and factors shaping the commercial determinants 
of health, but also, importantly, the way in which these 
factors relate to each other and how they generate envi-
ronments which negatively affect health.25
This paper explores the links between UCIs, analyses 
the extent of alignment across their corporate political 
strategies and proposes a cohesive systems approach to 
research across UCIs.
METHODS
First, an international meeting of researchers was organ-
ised in February 2016 on ‘Analysing the Involvement 
of Unhealthy Commodity Industries in Public Health 
Policy’. The event convened 50 researchers in the areas 
of food, alcohol, tobacco and gambling research from 20 
academic institutions representing a range of relevant 
disciplines.32 One of the conclusions of the meeting was 
the acknowledgement of a shared experience in UCI 
research, highlighting common challenges, prompting a 
move out of ‘disciplinary bunkers’33 and the formulation 
of a more integrated research agenda. Another impor-
tant output of the meeting was agreement on the need 
for appropriate conceptual and methodological tools 
for analysing the role of UCIs in public health, such as 
complex systems approaches. This paper is written as a 
response to the aims and challenges set out during that 
initial event.
Second, we conducted a narrative review to analyse 
the business links between UCIs, defined here as invest-
ments, either ownership of companies or strategic invest-
ments such as equity stakes in a company. We focused on 
the activities of prominent alcohol, ultra- processed food 
and drink products, tobacco and gambling industries, 
while acknowledging that neither the list of UCIs, nor the 
literature reported, is exhaustive. We analysed publicly 
available information authored by, or on the subject of, 
business links between UCIs, sourced from peer- reviewed 
and grey literature. We employed terms reflecting UCIs 
(for example alcohol, food), terms related to network 
links between corporations and across industries (such as 
connection, relationship, partnership, ‘revolving doors’ 
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and ‘interlocking directorates’) to guide the search.26 We 
conducted searches on company websites themselves to 
characterise and identify links between businesses. Due 
to the number of potential links it was not possible to 
produce an exhaustive list of links.
Third, we searched for taxonomies of corporate polit-
ical activities (CPAs) employed by UCIs. The CPAs of 
the UCIs are typically designed to support market goals 
by leveraging political and social influence to affect 
policy.2 33–41 CPAs are defined as corporate strategies to 
shape government policy in ways favourable to them42; 
their use by individual UCIs has been extensively docu-
mented.38–40 43 44 We referred to these taxonomies to 
collate and compare CPAs across the four selected UCIs, 
to identify the degree of similarity between them. The 
taxonomies of corporate political strategies that we drew 
on in this research were themselves developed from 
systematic reviews of large bodies of evidence, starting 
with the early versions of the tobacco39 and alcohol38 
taxonomies, followed by taxonomies of food industry 
CPA45 and combined with other work.46The systematic 
literature reviews and resulting taxonomies thus enabled 
comparisons of CPA between UCIs, suggesting simi-
larity in tactics.38 39 43 We used the taxonomies to code 
our examples, seeking evidence of commonalities across 
industries. The included examples are intended to be 
illustrative but not exhaustive.
RESULTS
Business links across UCIs
There is consistent evidence of business links across 
UCIs.26 35 36 41 47–49 These links can be expressed as busi-
ness investments, ownership of companies, strategic 
investments such as equity stakes in a company, or other 
affiliations such as via presence on a board of directors 
(interlocking directorates). The benefits achieved from 
these links include the establishment of synergies across 
marketing strategies and sharing of data on consumer 
characteristics.50
For example, Nguyen et al report on the tobacco 
industry’s early diversification into food and drink, 
highlighting Philip Morris’ and RJ Reynolds’ stakes 
in the sugar- sweetened beverage market, acquiring or 
developing brands such as Kool Aid from the 1960s.50 
Currently, the tobacco company Altria (formerly Philip 
Morris Companies) owns Ste Michelle Wine Estates51 
and has a considerable stake (about 10%) in alcohol 
giant ABInBev.52 In 2016, ABInBev acquired the South 
African brewer SABMiller, which until recently bottled 
and distributed Coca- Cola across many African coun-
tries.51 53 ABInBev still owns a company which distributes 
Pepsico products including Pepsi, 7Up and Gatorade.54 
Since 2018 Altria has also owned a 45% stake in Cronos 
Group, a cannabis company.55 Similarly, British American 
Tobacco is a corporate partner of Aristocrat Leisure, a 
major poker machine manufacturer, and Tabcorp, a 
major gambling operator.56 Many of these business links 
also take the form of ‘interlocking directorates’, when a 
person affiliated with one organisation sits on the board 
of directors of another.57 A recent social network anal-
ysis of the links across the top six transnational manufac-
turers of tobacco, alcohol and ultra- processed food and 
drink products found that alcohol companies provided 
bridges between tobacco and food companies, and high-
lighted how these links bolstered influence with political 
elites and health agencies.26
‘Revolving door’ between the public and private sectors, and 
across UCIs
The relationship between UCIs and the government is 
characterised as complex and dynamic.13 The ‘revolving 
door’ phenomenon is one where individuals will move 
from the public to the private sector and vice versa, in 
various capacities, so that industry is able to acquire 
inside information on how policy works and gain privi-
leged access to policy fora; conversely, private actors are 
recruited into public service posts and can then help 
make public policy.13 58 The anticorruption organisation 
Transparency International explains that this works to 
‘undermine trust in government, because of the potential 
for real or perceived conflicts of interests brought about 
by the risk of clouded judgements and actions motivated 
by the prospect of future careers, either in public office 
or in the private sector.59
One example of this phenomenon is a former director- 
general of the WHO who, having previously publicly 
defended the WHO publication of evidence- based sugar 
intake guidelines60 against direct threats from The Sugar 
Association to lobby Congress to remove US funding to 
the WHO,61 took a role as consultant to PepsiCo.62 During 
the same period, the executive director responsible for 
the prevention of chronic disease, and an early cham-
pion of the Framework Convention for Tobacco Control, 
also followed his WHO tenure with a spell at PepsiCo. 
Supported by a 12- year funding commitment from Philip 
Morris International of $1 billion, he then launched 
the Foundation for a Smoke- Free World in supporting 
‘tobacco harm reduction’ and identifying alternative 
livelihoods for tobacco farmers.63 Additional examples 
include the chief executive of the UK Wine and Spirit 
Trade Association having previously been deputy director 
of European Union Affairs and International Agriculture 
Policy within the Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs.64 Moreover, in the context of the UK 
Department of Health’s Public Health Responsibility Deal 
(RD), a public–private partnership with the food, alcohol 
and other industries in England, with the stated goal of 
improving health,65 the UK Government Cabinet Office 
official formerly responsible for the RD alcohol network 
then took on a leadership role in the Portman Group, 
a UK body representing the alcohol industry, and with 
The International Alliance for Responsible Drinking, 
the industry’s global social aspects and public relations 
organisation. Such behaviour may have contributed to 
the RD including measures which were largely ineffective 
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(and would have been known to be in advance, based on 
the evidence at the time).66 67 The US provides a range of 
examples of the ‘revolving door’ between the public and 
private sectors,68 including a Center for Science in the 
Public Interest lawyer moving to become a lobbyist for 
The Sugar Association.69 A recent study on the ‘revolving 
door’ in Australia found that a significant proportion of 
lobbyists were previously government representatives, 
citing several examples of government employees going 
to work directly for alcohol, food or gambling industries, 
often in roles directly related to their previous employ-
ment in government.70
Commonalities of corporate political strategies across UCIs
As illustrated in the table 1 below, UCIs commonly employ 
a range of CPAs, most notably shaping the evidence, 
framing techniques, constituency building and policy 
substitution, to promote their interests within public 
health policy debates. The following section elaborates 
on commonalities of CPAs across UCIs.
UCIs often use common resources to help shape the 
narrative about their products and behaviours and to 
protect their interests, including the same legal, public 
relations and marketing firms, as well as think- tanks and 
lobbyists71 72; examples of the latter include authors of 
publications attempting to discredit the evidence under-
pinning harms related to, and regulation required to 
control, gambling,73 food,74 75 tobacco76 77 and alcohol.78
UCIs join forces to promote non- regulatory initiatives38 
which might include financial or non- financial transac-
tions. Common examples include self- regulation codes, 
such as the UK Code of Non- Broadcast Advertising, Sales 
Promotion and Direct Marketing which covers alcohol 
and e- cigarette marketing,79 and the Australian Adver-
tising Standards Bureau and Association of National 
Advertisers and related organisations (alcohol, food and 
gambling), including a self- regulation code on gambling 
advertising and aspects of alcohol promotion.80
UCIs also align their efforts in forming alliances with 
other sectors, organisations or the public to create 
an appearance of larger support for industry’s posi-
tion.38 40 45 This is commonly done through the promo-
tion and sponsoring of efforts beyond the core or 
immediate business. For example, most UCIs have envi-
ronmental sustainability programmes or commitments, 
and though many businesses have made significant 
changes toward environmentally sustainable working 
and production practices, the mission of sustainability 
is now also about market advantage81 82: as explained 
in a recent Massachusetts Institute of Technology study 
about ‘eco- business’, ‘when sustainability burst onto 
the scene (…) it was in the responsibility category (…) 
but now it is equally about saving money.’81 UCIs either 
create or voluntarily join existing sustainability initia-
tives; one such example is the CEO Water Mandate, 
a water stewardship commitment platform for busi-
ness leaders asking them to voluntarily commit to six 
action areas, including contributing to public policy. 
The CEO Water Mandate is established by the UN’s 
Global Compact, itself criticised for compromising the 
integrity of the UN by using corporate engagement as 
an instrument of global governance.83 The Mandate’s 
Steering Committee includes ABInBev (alcohol), Nestlé 
(food), Broken Hill Proprietary Company (mining and 
petroleum) and Dow Chemicals. Global initiatives are 
supported by industry- specific strategies, such as Inter-
national Game Technology’s (a word leading gambling 
company) sustainability strategy,84 multinational alco-
holic beverage company Diageo’s Water Stewardship 
Strategy,85 food giant Nestlé’s Water Policies and Stew-
ardship86 and British American Tobacco’s commitment 
to environmental sustainability.87
UCIs also shape scientific processes, often resulting 
in the production of misinformation, research agendas 
favourable to their interests and subtle influencing of the 
scientific evidence38; often through mechanisms such as 
the provision of academic funding, sponsorship or schol-
arship programmes. Thus SpiritsEUROPE, an organisa-
tion supporting the interests of the European alcoholic 
spirits sector, claims explicitly that ‘to control the science 
agenda is to (partly) influence the policy agenda’.88 Other 
examples include UCI coalitions with research funding 
councils, such as a coalition of major food and beverage 
industries and UK Research Councils entitled the Diet 
and Health Research Industry Club, jointly financing 
nutrition research89: the industry partners provide only 
10% of the funding but shape the research agenda to 
their advantage. Supportive researchers are also invited 
to play down adverse health effects of unhealthy prod-
ucts in scientific publications by, for example, writing 
rebuttals of research that might harm industry interests.2 
Thus a researcher was offered £10 000 by the gambling 
industry to report that gambling problem was a minor 
issue.2 33 Philip Morris’ former Worldwide Scientific Affairs 
Program spent about US$200 million to fund medical 
schools to conduct research on tobacco smoking90; the 
programme was closed in 2007, but the tobacco industry 
continues to influence research, such as via the RJ Reyn-
olds Chair of Medicine at Duke University, funded by the 
RJ Reynolds tobacco company.91 The alcohol industry- 
funded Foundation for Advancing Alcohol Responsi-
bility sponsors a $3.3 million endowed chair at Harvard 
Medical School’s Cambridge Health Alliance.92
UCIs often exploit narratives of a suboptimal evidence 
base to undermine, and create doubt about, public 
health interventions that have been shown to be effec-
tive by demanding forms of causal proof that are not 
possible to achieve in public health.93 94 The best known 
example is the tobacco industry’s decade- long attempt 
to undermine the evidence on smoking and cancer, by 
calling for ever stronger causal evidence, for instance 
from randomised trials, when no such evidence could 
be produced ethically. Similar strategies can also be 
seen by other industries, including gambling, food and 
alcohol, which advance the idea that the complexity of 
the causes of public health problems is such that the 
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correct solutions are sufficiently unclear that nothing 
can or should be done until more and better evidence is 
produced.95 96
Table 1 uses the taxonomies of CPA38–40 43 45 46 to code 
examples of CPA across UCIs.
DISCUSSION
There are clear commonalities across UCIs’ strategies 
in their attempts to shape policy- relevant evidence, 
promote favourable policy narratives, frame debates, and 
engage in constituency building and policy substitution. 
Our findings support existing studies in demonstrating 
strong business links across different UCIs, complex 
inter- relationships between UCIs and public sector 
actors which lead to UCI engagement in policy- making 
forums, and clear commonalities in CPA employed across 
UCIs.4 38 39 97–101
Our study echoes others in calling for a unified 
approach to research on UCIs25 36 102 and argues for 
a complex systems approach to analyse the linkages 
between UCIs and the way in which they collectively 
influence policy.103 Complex systems thinking has long 
been recommended as a powerful tool for the analysis 
of UCIs, but has been underused to date.104 It allows 
for the impact of UCIs on health to be conceived not so 
much as an aggregation of individual ‘choices’ but more 
a result of the interactions between diverse actors, factors 
and their environments.29 105 This entails acknowledging 
that UCIs’ actions, and interactions between them, are 
greater than the sum of their parts, producing change 
across the system.31 67 103
A systems approach provides tools to help under-
stand how a system is functioning, and what might be 
the leverage points at which to make desired changes.106 
Given that the drivers of public health governance are 
shaped by broad political, institutional, economic and 
cultural factors, such a methodology can encompass the 
numerous, varied actors involved, the dynamism and 
non- linearity of behaviour and effect, and the impact of 
feedback in the system. It encourages the investigation of 
complex research questions,107 including: What are the 
intended and unintended consequences of UCIs’ efforts? 
What effects emerge from interactions between UCIs to 
affect policy change, and how do the effects change over 
time, and why? Are the effects of cross- UCI influences 
over policy supported or suppressed by other aspects 
of the system? Operationalising such research could, 
in the first instance, include generating causal loop 
diagrams31 67 and social network analyses108 to capture 
the range of actors involved, the connections between 
them and the pathways through which they influence 
public health- related policy- making. Such research could 
lead to the development of a theoretical framework 
for understanding and studying UCIs, individually and 
collectively; for conducting comparative research across 
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in shaping public health policy processes, content and 
evidence use in public health policy.
Adopting a complex systems approach, partnered with 
an understanding of the interplay and links between 
industries and their strategies, reduces the risk of siloed 
working. It can elucidate ways in which public health 
actions taken to address specific industry strategies can 
potentially lead to changes in others parts of the system 
and industry behaviour that ultimately undermine any 
benefits intended to be gained from that initial public 
health intervention.
The risk of conflict of interest emerging from the 
involvement of UCIs in public health is considerable and 
complex. Thus the study of how to mitigate conflict of inter-
ests related to UCI engagement in public health would 
also benefit from a complex systems approach.71 109–112 
This allows moving away from the predominantly indi-
vidualistic lens, such as how a person’s financial interests 
might affect their decision- making.113 114 While indi-
vidual risks should also be managed, a complex systems 
approach allows for more fundamental questions to be 
explored, including the institutional or structural impli-
cations of conflicts between the interests of UCIs and 
health goals.114 Interactions between public health policy 
stakeholders and UCIs carry systemic risks, including 
bias in research priorities and conduct, and interpreta-
tion of findings, leading to ineffective or delayed public 
health policy.89 115–119 Many agencies and individuals, 
including researchers, do not adequately recognise 
the risks of these interactions and few have policies in 
place to reduce them. Where UCIs are involved in areas 
of research or policy relevant to their interest, such as 
supply chains or implementation of market controls, 
effective safeguards are needed to manage conflict in 
the agendas.109 114 120 Again, here, a systems approach can 
provide a way of conceptualising these multiple factors, 
actors and interactions.
This analysis has also shown that there is a shared strategy 
across UCIs to shape both scientific evidence and narra-
tives about a sub- optimal public health evidence base, to 
suit their interests. The production of evidence should 
therefore be supported by procedures that render public 
health policy- making more transparent and less subject 
to these tactics.121 To support this, a broader conception 
of what constitutes ‘good’ or ‘good enough’ evidence in 
this field is required, one which embraces a wider range 
of research. This will require the integration of mixed 
methods from diverse sources and disciplines including 
quantitative and qualitative traditions31 to provide insight 
into UCI engagement in public health policy- making, 
and into how networks across sectors create the circum-
stances under which public health and political actors 
operate.122–124 Innovative methods such as framing anal-
ysis of social media would be useful for tracing the trajec-
tory of policy ideas, and investigating concepts such as 
‘responsibility’, ‘moderation’ and ‘nanny state’, and 
how they are transmitted through policy communities of 
interest.32
Finally, it is important to emphasise that this approach 
does not obviate the need for single- commodity industry 
research. Rather, researchers need to be comfortable at 
both levels, and to be mindful of the need to compare 
and contrast findings to evidence of UCI activity within 
and across topics. Single- industry enquiry can elucidate 
fissures and differences in strategy both between and 
within industries, that may be important to understand 
in order to achieve public health gains. Further, there 
will always be a need to evaluate policies which apply 
to a single commodity, because these are particularly 
well understood and exploited by UCIs125 and because 
of the likelihood that controls on one commodity may 
positively or negatively influence use of another. A 
cross- UCI programme of research would support single 
UCI research as well as encouraging greater recognition 
of the commonalities of corporate strategies.
The policy implications of the research reported here 
include the need for: clarity on processes and governance 
structures of public health policies; frameworks to under-
stand the nature of relationships and accountability 
among policymakers or others influencing policy; guide-
lines and tools to gauge the extent to which the stated 
primary public health aims of policies may be compro-
mised by corporate political strategies for example, as a 
result of explicit or hidden conflicts of interest; and ulti-
mately more effective public health policy mechanisms.32
CONCLUSION
The global NCD epidemic is largely driven by the 
consumption of harmful commodities such as alcohol, 
tobacco, gambling and UPP. There is conspicuous 
consistency across the UCIs that produce, promote and 
sell these goods employing corporate political strategies 
to maintain commercial interests through their involve-
ment in public health policy- making. Given the magni-
tude of the NCD challenge and the similarity of strate-
gies employed by UCIs, there is a strong rationale for 
researchers to investigate the links between these indus-
tries more systematically, taking a systems approach to do 
so. A convergent strategy taking a systems approach to 
research across UCIs is required to deepen shared under-
standing of this complex and interconnected area and 
also to inform a more effective and coherent response. 
Understanding common processes will allow for the 
identification and implementation of more effective 
interventions to regulate and manage the activities of 
UCIs. Taking a systems approach to conduct cross- UCI, 
multinational comparative analyses using appropriate 
and rigorous methodologies across a range of disci-
plines will also provide the opportunity for enhancing 
and supporting analyses of individual industries in single 
countries. Such an endeavour will not only deepen collec-
tive understanding of this complex area but also inform 
the development of more effective public policies related 
to one of the principal public health challenges in the 
world.
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